Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Ashcroft v. Airfax Express : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Benjamin A. Sims; Michael E. Dyer; Attorney for Airfax.
Bruce J. Wilson; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Ashcroft v. Airfax Express, No. 920586 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3559

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

4
U T A H

C O U R T

O F

AFFF.AIL.S

DENIS ASHCROFT,
Case No. 920586-CA

P e t i t i or* ^ T

vs.
AIRFAX EXPRESS, LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY/ and the
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Priority No. 7

Respondents.
B R I E F

OF

P E T I T I O N E R

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

Bruce J. Wilson, Esq.
290 East 4000 North
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Petiti

Michael E. Dyer, Esq.
50 South Main, #700
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Attorney for Airfax Express
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

U T A H

C O U R T

O F

AJPFEiVLS

DENIS ASHCROFT,
Petitioner,

Case No. 920586-CA

vs.
AIRFAX EXPRESS, LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, and the
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Priority No. 7

Respondents.
BRIEF

OF

P E T I T I O N E R

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

Bruce J. Wilson, Esq.
290 East 4000 North
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Petitioner

Michael E. Dyer, Esq.
50 South Main, #700
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Attorney for Airfax Express
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T A B L E

OF

C O N T E N T S
Page

Table of Authorities

ii

Jurisdiction of the Court
Statement of the Issue(s)/Standard of Appellate Review

1
.... 1

Determinative Statute/Rule

2

Statement of the Case

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings

2

C.

Disposition Below

3

D.

Statement of the Facts

3

Summary of Argument(s)
Argument
I.

8

i

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER

9

THE CONTINUING MEDICAL PROBLEMS CLEARLY AROSE OUT OF THE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND NOT OUT OF SUBSEQUENT
"EPISODES"

11

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES

17

Conclusion/Statement of Relief Sought .

22

Addendum

25

II.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T A B L E

OF

A U T H O R I T I E S

CASES;

Page
Action v, Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987)

16

Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) . . . .

15

Askrew v. Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) . . . 9
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141,
405 P.2d 613 (1965)

9

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission,
703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985)_

21

Chandler v. Industrial Commission,
184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919)

9

Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319 (Colo. App. 1982)
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984)

13
. . . .

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990)

14
17

. . . .

9

Hone v. J.F. Shea Co. , 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986)

21

J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983)

9

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission.,
709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985)

14

Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983)

16

Lipman v. Industrial Commission,
592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979)
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948)

8, 14, 21
9

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). . 2, 9
Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review,
817 P. 2d 328 (Utah 1991)
ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)

1

Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)

. . 16

Powers v. Industrial Commission, 427 P.2d 740 (Utah 1967) . . 13
Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980) . . . 9
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission,
617 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1980)
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission,
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984)
Virgin v. Industrial Commission,
592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979)

16
21
2, 9
14

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) . . . . 2, 17, 18, 21
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53(2) (1988)

1

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 (1988)

1

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16 (1988)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1988)

.1
1

RULES
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
2, 18, 21

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
August 21, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as
a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for Review of that
Order was timely filed with this Court on September 11, 1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPFT.T.ATE REVIEW
There are two substantial issues presented for review:
(1)

whether the Industrial Commission committed error by

applying the wrong standard of proof i.e., "substantial evidence"
rather than upon a preponderance of the evidence as required by
well established law;

and,

(2) whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion
by failing to convene a Medical Panel.
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to
the agency's view of the law is required.

Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d)
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah
1
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State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner.

State

Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah

1977) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

determinative statute in this case.

35-1-77

(1988)

is

the

Rule R568-1-9(A) of the

Industrial Commissions administrative rules is also applicable.
They are each set forth in full in the Addendum thereto as Exhibit
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Ashcroft seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
workers' compensation occasioned by his industrial accident.
Course of Proceedings
As the result of an industrial injury which occurred on
September 25, 1989, (R. at 1), the employer's compensation insurer
paid temporary total disability benefits from September 26, 1989
through June 5, 1990 as well as compensation for a 5% permanent
2
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partial impairment.

(R. at 18).

Petitioner claimed that despite

attempts he was unable to return to work and that he needed
additional medical care, a longer period

of temporary total

compensation and a higher permanent partial impairment rating. (R.
at 1). Further benefits were denied, and Mr. Ashcroft filed an
application for hearing.

A Formal Hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge on May 19, 1992. (R. at 22).
Disposition Below
On

September

26, 1991

Petitioner

filed

for

additional

temporary disability compensation, increased permanent partial
disability rating and medical expenses alleging that as the result
of his September 25, 1989 industrial injury he was no longer able
to work.

(R. at 1 ) .

1992, denied

the

The Administrative Law Judge on June 29,

claim

for

additional

compensation, medical

benefits and impairment benefits without referring the matter to a
medical panel.

(R. at 39-46, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit

B).
Mr. Ashcroft filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial
Commission which was subsequently denied on August 21, 1992.
at 64-68, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C).

(R.

He challenges

that final agency action in his Petition for Review. (R. at 69-80).
Statement of the Facts
There is no dispute as to the basic facts of Mr. Ashcroft's
industrial injury. The initial period of compensation and medical
treatment was paid.

The dispute arises because the employer's

insurance carrier discontinued all benefits before the petitioner
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and his doctors felt he had reached maximum medical improvement,
and because his doctors felt he had a higher impairment than the
supervising adjuster was willing to pay.
Following the accident on September 25, 1989, and an initial
evaluation in the emergency room, Mr. Ashcroft was seen and treated
by his family doctor, Dr. M. K. McGregor, who continued to treat
him during the following two months. (R. at 130-136). Dr. McGregor
advised complete bed rest and diagnosed him as having a bulging
disc/spinal

stenosis.

(R. at

133).

After

two months of

unsuccessful treatment, Dr. McGregor referred the patient to Dr.
Donald G. Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss initially saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989 and
diagnosed, "Central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at
this level."

He recommended conservative treatment with physical

therapy primarily for work hardening, but also had him under
consideration for surgery.

(R. at 146).

In December, 1989 Dr.

Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral leg pain and after
reviewing a myelogram and CT scan, his diagnoses was "Sciatica-like
symptoms with central disc herniation and no definite evidence of
neural impingement."

(R. at 150).

Dr. Bliss noted that Mr.

Ashcroft7s multiple level disc disease indicated that he has had
pre-existing problems.

(R. at 151).

On February 2, 1990, in

response to an inquiry from State Vocational Rehabilitation, and to
the dismay of the insurance adjuster, Dr. Bliss concluded that Mr.
Ashcroft7s "... evaluation and treatment are incomplete.
153).
4
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(R. at

At the behest of the insurance carrier Mr. Ashcroft7s case was
transferred to Dr. Neal Capel, an orthopedic physician. (R. at 157173).

Dr. Capel's initial visit notes in reference to the

insurance adjusters referral instructions state as follows:
... Liberty Mutual account manager determined his
permanent partial disability as 5%, March 26, 1990, is
the cutoff of benefits... The patient will have his
disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his
work hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks. He will be
revaluated on May 13 before he is released for unlimited
activity. He seems to have had a strong improvement in
his attitude and seems to be desirous of accepting and
working with these provisions. (R. at 158).
Dr. Capel placed him on a work hardening and conditioning program.
(R. at 158).
On May 10, 1990, Mr. Ashcroft experienced intrascapular pain,
and was treated at an emergency room.

Dr. Capel diagnosed this

incident as "anxiety reaction with somatization."

(R. at 159).

Dr. Capel continued to recommend general conditioning.

(R. at

159) .
On June 5, 1990, Dr. Capel's office notes state, "... The
patient has no change in his status and was given a work release.
(R. at 160).
Although he had been released to work by Dr. Capel, the
patient continued to complain of medical problems and Dr. Capel
continued to give medical treatment, the last visit being March 15,
1991.

He complained that sitting made him uncomfortable and that

he had aching muscles

(R. at 161), and low back pain in November

1990 after he lifted two or three pieces of firewood.

In March

1991, Mr. Ashcroft reported back pain after he had bent over to
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

clean up after his dog, and that he had difficulty straightening
up.

(R. at 167).

Dr. Capel concluded that he had a recurrence of

iliolumbar strain spain and noted:
I further advised him that as far as the Industrial
Commission is concerned, he is an administrative catch 22
situation where he cannot force them to assume care of
his present complaint and while it is possibly associated
in quality relation, it is a new episode. (R. at 167).
After that Mr. Ashcroft concluded that he was not going to get
satisfactory care from Dr. Capel and changed to Dr. D.R. McNaught
on May 8, 1991.

Dr. McNaught concluded that he had severe

sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar discs L4,5 and possibly LS.
He recommended surgery, but surgery was never performed because it
was discovered that the patient had AIDS which complicated the
situation by rendering surgery a more difficult option. (R. at 174175) .
During this period of evaluation , on August 19, 1991, Dr.
McNaught stated that Mr. Ashcroft was unable to return to work (R.
at 178). On September 5, 1991 Dr. McNaught reported "Apparently he
was released from light work at sometime in the past, which I feel
in retrospect was probable in error, as he does appear to require
a more aggressive approach to his low back . . .". (R. at 179).
Finally on April 23, 1992, after several other possible
interventions including chymopapain treatment had been considered
and ruled out, Dr. McNaught concluded that Mr. Ashcroft had a 10%
disability rating.
surgeon

for

(R. at 177). Dr. John Sanders, a consulting

Dr. McNaught, independently

impairment at 15%.

rated

the

(R. at 191).
6
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permanent

During this period, Mr. Ashcroft also received at his own
expense

chiropractic

care

from

Dr. Randall

N. Wageman

from

September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 when he was forced to
terminate treatment for financial reasons.

Dr. Wageman concluded

that Mr. Ashcroft suffered, "Chronic moderate to severe posttraumatic lumbar intervertebral disc syndrome with radiculopathy
resulting from over-exertion or strenuous movements."

He further

found "an exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in
the original accident" of 1989.

(R. at 122).

Respondents did not have Mr. Ashcroft personally examined by
a physician of their own choosing, but did have Dr. Boyd Holbrook
perform a "file review". On April 10, 1992, Dr. Holbrook concluded
on the basis of his examination of the medical records, which did
not include the reports of Dr. Wageman, that the majority of Mr.
Ashcroft's problems were not industrial in nature and that no
further medical treatment was needed in connection with his 1989
industrial injury.

(R. at 23-31).

The Administrative Law Judge found that there was not a
well-supported
rating
in
the
record,
and
the
Administrative Law Judge can only note that a 5%
impairment is reasonable for an unoperated disc problem
according to the AMA Guides To The Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, Table 53." (R. at 45).
Despite request by Mr. Ashcroft's attorney the Administrative Law
Judge refused to refer Mr. Ashcroft to a Medical Panel. (R. at 47).
This

refusal

Commission.

was

subsequently

sustained

by

the

Industrial

(R. at 67).

Petitioner's claim for additional disability benefits was
7
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denied by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29th, 1992. (R. at
45).

He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission

on July 15, 1992 (R. at 47-54), but it was denied on August 21,
1992.

(R. at 64-68) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
The Industrial Commission's findings were based on the wrong
standard of evidence.

The Commission refused to disturb the

Administrative Law Judge's Findings because they "... were based
upon substantial evidence."
appellate court review

The Commission applied the higher

standard rather than the lower level

appropriateD at the Industrial Commission level.

The appropriate

standard of review at the agency level is a "preponderance of the
evidence."

Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P. 616 (Utah

1979).
The medical evidence in this case demonstrated conflicting
disability

ratings which

ranged

from

zero % to

15%.

Utah

Administrative Code R568-1-9 makes the referral to a Medical Panel
mandatory when there are conflicting impairment ratings with more
than a 5% difference. Despite the fact that the Administrative Law
Judge found that the disability ratings were not

"well-supported"

she failed and refused to submit this matter to a Medical Panel.
Referral to a Medical panel was also called for under the Rule when
there is a dispute about the cutoff date of temporary total
disability
controversy.

and/or

more

than

$2,000.00

in

medical

bills

in

The refusal to convene a Medical Panel is in direct
8
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conflict and violates the Industrial Commission's own rules and
regulations.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's determination that Mr. Ashcroft did not establish
medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLTFD T.TKEKAT.T.Y
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER,
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well
established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this

principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fundf
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial
Commission, supra.,; J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405 P.2d

613

(Utah

1965); Askrew v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 189 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
9
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Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, at 1021-1022,
discussed the proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other, should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. (Emphasis added).
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact
and Conclusions

of Law

failed to apply this vital rule of
10
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construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the
injured worker.
The refusal to refer this matter to a Medical Panel is in
clear violation of the Industrial Commission's own rules and
regulations.

The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence

"humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law.

The entire

underlying basis of the Order is thus flawed and the entire Order
should be disregarded due to this conceptual flaw.

II
THE CONTINUING MEDICAL PROBLEMS CLEARLY AROSE OUT OF THE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND NOT OUT OF SUBSEQUENT "EPISODES,"
The

Administrative

Law

Judge

based

her

denial

on

the

following:
... according to medical specialists, the true cause of
the applicants continuing problems stem from preexisting
degenerative
problems, intervening nonindustrial events, and unrelated health conditions.
Therefore, his claim fails for lack of medical and legal
causation. (R. at 42).
A balanced review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Ashcroft
met his burden to demonstrate legal and medical causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The alleged "intervening non-industrial events" have been
blown entirely out of proportion by deeming them as causes of
ongoing injury when the evidence shows no subsequent events that
11
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would constitute an industrial accident and no medical evidence of
anything other than an episode of pain triggered by ordinary and
nonstrenuous activities which were painful only because of the
ongoing back injury that was caused by the original industrial
accident.

These supposed "intervening nonindustrial events" were

picking up three pieces of firewood in November, 1990 (R. at 165)
and bending over with a short-handled shovel to clean up after his
dog, in March 1991. (R. at 167). It would be difficult to classify
those

incidents

as

legally

or medically

significant events.

Although each event resulted in an office visit to Dr. Capel, no
new treatment was undertaken and Mr. Ashcroft's condition did not
change.

No continuing significance for those events can be found

in the medical records. The fact that the Administrative Law Judge
and the Industrial Commission seized upon them shows that they were
engaged in improper fact finding.
If there was any failure to find a medical cause of the
injuries Petitioner demonstrates, such failure resulted from the
Administrative Law Judge's failure to convene a Medical Panel, as
argued below.
The existing record however is replete with evidence of
medical causation.

In reaching the conclusion that there was not

a medical/industrial cause to Mr. Ashcroft's present condition the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission selectively
read the medical reports and

ignored

large portions of the

evidence. Dr. McGregor found a medical/industrial link (R. at 130136), as did Dr. Bliss (R. at 146-153), Dr. Capel

(R. at 158), Dr.

12
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McNaught (R. at 177) and Dr. Wageman (R. at 122).

In fact, the

only real evidence supporting the lack of medical causation is Dr.
Holbrook's "record review" (R. at 23-31) which was done without
actually examining Mr. Ashcroft, or having the complete medical
record.
There is a uncertainty as to the extent of Petitioner's preexisting back problems.
pre-existing

However, just because a person suffers a

condition, he

obtaining compensation.

or

she

is not disqualified

from

"Compensation is not dependant on the

state of an employee's health or his freedom from constitutional
weakness or latent tendency."
1321 (Colo. App., 1982).
aggravation

or

lighting

Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319,

The clear law of this state is that "the
up

of

a preexisting

industrial accident is compensable...."

disease

by

an

Powers v. Industrial

Commission, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (quoted with approval in
Allen, id.).
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which
would

suggest

partially

the

that

Petitioner's

result

of

the

injuries

were

industrial

not

at

accident.

least
The

Administrative Law Judge expressly found that at least 5% of Mr.
Ashcroft's permanent impairment was due to the industrial accident.
In its review, the Industrial Commission states that "We have
concluded that the specialists who determined that the applicant's
problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the opinion of Dr.
Wageman."

(R. at 67).

The Commission does not detail however how

they reached that conclusion or what balancing process they went
13
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through.

In fact, the Industrial Commission did not review the

record impartially or as a whole.

The Industrial Commission only

cites those portions of the record which support the findings of
the Administrative Law Judge and ignores any conflicting evidence.
The

Industrial

Commission

simply

cannot

arbitrarily

discount

competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial
injury was the cause of Petitioner's present permanent, disability.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah
1985).

Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984).

In addition, The Industrial Commission displayed confusion and
committed error when it sustained the Findings, Conclusions and
Order

of

the Administrative

"substantial evidence".

Law Judge

as being

based

upon

(R. at 65). The applicable standard is

that of "preponderance of the evidence" and not "substantial
evidence". In the case of Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d
616 (Utah 1979) the Utah Supreme Court reversed a similar effort of
the

Industrial

Commission

preponderance of evidence.

to

apply

another

standard

than

The Court stated as follows:

This Court has consistently held that the burden of proof
in Workmen's Compensation cases is proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 618.
Counsel for the Industrial Commission has admitted that he
uses the appellate standard of "substantial evidence" in passing on
Motions for Review. Virgin v. Industrial Commission, 803 P.2d 1284,
1290 (Utah App. 1990).

There is no evidence of balancing of the

conflicting evidence by the Industrial Commission and certainly no
resolution of doubt in favor of the Petitioner.

The Industrial

14
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Commission Order Denying Motion For Review rather is a marshalling
of the evidence in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, to the total
exclusion of any contrary evidence.
The application of the "substantial evidence" standard is
contrary to law and prejudices the injured worker by making him
respond to a higher standard of proof than required by law and
statute.
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this
matter are grossly
requirements.

inadequate

and do not meet recent legal

Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper

fact-finding.
In the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), the Court stated as follows:
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact
occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
the possible subsidiary findings.
The findings are
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20.
The Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and the
15
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Industrial Commission are deficient in that they fail to properly
address, in detail, the issue of medical causation. The absence of
a Medical Panel report makes this failure even more glaring.
Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law
Judge, dispute

that

Petitioner

is permanently

impaired, the

Administrative Law Judge did not specify the degree to which that
disability

was

caused

by

the

1989

industrial

injury.

The

Administrative Law Judge selectively reads the medical reports,
giving undue weight to a file review by Dr. Holbrook while
virtually ignoring the preponderance of the medical evidence. She
does not make concise findings as to Petitionees current medical
condition and the causes for it.

This failure was undoubtedly

compounded by the Administrative Law Judge,s unwarranted refusal to
submit the matter to a Medical Panel as complained below, and that
failure manifests itself here in inadequate findings.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

recently

informed

this

Commission that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact,
16
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Conclusions of Law and Order should at a minimum be vacated and a
new Order entered with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.
1989) .

Ill
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL,
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as
follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed
by the commission.
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to
refer this matter to a Medical Panel, Respondent Utah Industrial
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as
follows:
the Applicant has failed to show medical and legal
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel
is necessary. (R. at 45).
That rational finds no basis in law, statute or rule.

Utah

Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) expressly contemplates that
referrals to Medical Panels will result "... if the employer or its
17
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insurance

carrier

denies

liability..."

determine

medical

causation

and

It

degrees

is expressly

of

disability

to

that

referrals to Medical Panels are made.
Utah

Industrial

Commission

Rule

R568-1-9

governing

the

"necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in
relevant part as follows:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.... (emphasis added). See Addendum,
Exhibit A.
The Rule requires that a panel "will" be used when "one or
more significant medical issues may be involved".

The rule does

not, as Respondents seem to suggest, state that a Medical Panel
will only be convened when the injured worker has proved both
medical and legal causation.
will be used when there

Rather the Rule states that a Panel

are conflicting medical

reports of

permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person, a disparity of more than 90 days on the temporary total
18
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cutoff date or more than $2,000 in medical expenses in controversy.
It can not be disputed that this case clearly contains
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary by more than 5% of the whole person.

Dr. Holbrook gave Mr.

Ashcroft a zero % physical impairment. (R. at 23-31), Dr. McNaught
rated the Petitioner at 10% impairment of the whole person (R. at
177), and Dr. Sanders indicated that he had a 15% whole person
rating (R. at 191), a difference of 15%.
It little matters that Respondents do not believe that the
doctor's ratings are "not well supported" (R. at 37).

It appears

that at least Dr. McNaught did not extensively document his 10%
rating because the insurance carrier told him that they agreed with
it.

In such a case, Dr. McNaught reasonably concluded that he

would not have to give all of his subsidiary findings which led him
to conclude that the Petitioner had a 10% impairment. Respondents
should be estopped from attacking the lack of detailed support for
the disability ratings when they were responsible for the omission
of that support. (R. at 177).
The Rule does not say that referral will occur only when the
Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial Commission finds that
there are "well supported conflicting medical reports;" rather it
states that referral will occur when there are "conflicting medical
reports", (emphasis added).

It is, in fact, to determine the

credibility of the initial medical reports that referrals to
Medical Panels are required when there is more than a 5% variance
in the impairment ratings.
19
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The Administrative Law Judge adopted a finding of 5% whole
person permanent impairment with absolutely no factual support in
the record. None of the many doctors who examined Mr. Ashcroft or
his records assigned a 5% rating.

The only support in the record

for a 5% rating is the determination of Respondent Liberty Mutual's
account manager in April 1990 that 5% was appropriate.

(R. at

158).
There was also

"conflicting medical opinions as to the

temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days" as
provided in section (A)(1)(b) of the administrative rule.

Dr.

Capel gave the Petitioner a work release on June 5, 1990 (R. at
160) and that is the date Respondents have relied on for the cutoff
of

temporary

total

compensation.

However, Dr. McNaught on

September 5, 1991, well over a year later felt that date was in
error.

(R. at 179).

Clearly there is a dispute as to the

appropriate temporary total cutoff date which vary by far more than
the mere 90 days provided in the Rule.

This is another issue on

which the assistance of a Medical Panel would have been extremely
helpful.
Finally,

there

is

are

medical

amounting to more than $2,000.00.
made

no

findings

on

this

expenses

in

controversy

The Administrative Law Judge

issue,

however

the

record

does

specifically document that there is at least $4,000.00 in disputed
medical bills.
additional

(R. at 116).

medical

care

In addition, Mr. Ashcroft needs

which

Respondents

have

authorize.
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refused

to

The conflict in the medical reports and concern over legal and
medical causation is why referral to a medical panel is required in
the circumstances presented here and the failure to do so is more
than an abuse of discretion-it is plain error.

See Lipman v.

Industrial Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission,
617 P. 2d

693

(Utah 1980) interpreting

the former Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to medical
panels mandatory in cases of denied liability.
Even more than an abuse of discretion, the failure of an
administrative agency to adhere to its own rules and regulations
raises grave questions of possible violations of Petitioners
constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
Although reference to a medical panel under Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion
is

not

unrestricted

and

has

been

made

mandatory

in

some

circumstances by the Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah
Admin. Code R568-1-9).

The failure to refer a matter to a Medical

Panel when such referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some
cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection between the
work-related event and the injury is uncertain or highly technical,
failure to refer the case to a medical panel may be an abuse of
discretion." Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).

See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co. . 728

P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986).
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Applicant's claims for additional compensation and
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medical care if not clear, was at least uncertain and failure to
refer the matter to a medical panel was error.

The Order Denying

Motion for Review should, at the least, be reversed and the matter
remanded with directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel
since

failure to do was in direct conflict with

Commission practice and rule.

Industrial

The failure to obtain a Medical

Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitionees
claim.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered it's August 21, 1992
Order

affirming the Order of the Administrative Law Judge and

denied Mr. Ashcroft additional compensation for lack of medical
causation. The uncontroverted evidence submitted to the industrial
Commission supports the finding that he sustained a significant
permanent partial impairment due to his 1989 industrial accident,
and that his impairment exceeds 5%.

To the extent there is any

doubt or confusion as to medical causation, it was error for the
Administrative Law Judge not to convene a Medical Panel.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical
evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical
panel.
DATED this 36 th day of November, 1992.
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BRUCE J. wl:
WILSON, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I

hereby

foregoing Brief
this

certify

that

of Petitioner

true

and

correct

were mailed,

copies

of the

postage prepaid, on

n 'U day of December, 1992, to the following:

Michael E. Dyer, Esq.
50 "south Main, #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600

JkUJA.
Bruce Wilson
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(A) (1988).
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9.

EXHIBIT B;

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(June 29, 1992).

EXHIBIT C:

Order Denying Motion for Review (August 21, 1992).
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Hedical director or medical consultants —
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991)
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall,
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine
to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and -also make such additional findings as the commission may
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged,*
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so,
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered
admitted in evidence.

EXHIBIT A
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(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing
for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the
testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Seinsurance Fund, (as last
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case No. 91000984

DENIS ASHCROFT,

*
it
it

FINDINGS OF FACT,

Applicant,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
AIRFAX EXPRESS,
and/or
LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE,

AND ORDER

it
it
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • i t

Defendants.

•

HEARING:

Commission Conference Room, Washington County
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Bruce
Wilson, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney at Law.

This is a claim for additional temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89
industrial injury.
The defendant insurance carrier denies
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation.
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury.
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DENIS ASHCROFT
ORDER
PAGE TWO
On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer.
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room.
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St.
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal
stenosis at this level." He recommended conservative treatment.
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.)
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He
stated his impression was ". . . sciatica-like symptoms with
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a
neurological consult.
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and
noted " . . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without
definite stenosis." Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, ".
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is
not his major complaint at this time." (Ex. D-l, p. 24.)
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as
" . . . medically stable for return to limited employment in nonlaboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified
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DENIS ASHCROFT
ORDER
PAGE THREE
that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late
1989, due to a prior lien.
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic
physician, Dr. Neal Capel.
Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, " . . . Liberty Mutual
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%,
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.)
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for
intrascapular pain and noted, " . . . The most likely explanation is
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning.
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ".
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.)
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work,
but began attending school at Dixie College.
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that
sitting required by the applicant's school activities was making
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft's anxiety symptoms.
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr.
Capel's notes state, ". . . H e has found that the back did fairly
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn.
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.)
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft
lifted firewood and had, " . . . sudden onset of low back pain..."
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his
fireplace.
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At his January 29, 1991f office visit, the applicant reported
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again
during Christmas and experienced leg aches.
He requested a
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it
due to side effects.
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr.
Capel reported another episode of back pain: "The patient has been
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight." Dr.
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . . 1 further advised him that as
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p.
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening
up.
Following Dr. Capel's treatment, the applicant was examined by
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some
reservations about that approach.
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.)
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992,
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression.
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no
reference to the AIDS factors.
Dr. Sanders also wrote a one
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on
that basis alone." (Ex. D-l, p. 66.)
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, ,f. .
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex." Dr. Holbrook
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, lf. . .it does not appear that
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67).
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St.
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the
original accident," of 1989 (Ex. A-l).
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: xrays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91).
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache
medicines.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore,
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation.
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact,
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss,
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable.
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers
compensation law is specific on this issue, ,f. . . Once a claimant
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary
benefits." Booms v. Rapp Constructionf 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiff's burden to prove,
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah
1988).
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic11 stage of his
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS
condition, which may not have become a ••. . .severe medical v
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery,
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment.
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors
refused to surgically treat.
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the
applicant.
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving preexisting and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally
contributing to his continuing back problems*
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Ashcroft, for additional temporary
expenses compensation in connection
September 25, 1989, should be and
legal and medical causation.

claim of the applicant, Denis
total disability and medical
with his industrial injury of
is hereby denied for lack of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law
Certified this ^ d a y of . tQa^jL^
ATTEST:
£/

Patricia 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary

, 199,2.
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^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the "•,">'' day of June, 1992, the
attached FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER in the case
of Denis Ashcroft was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following
persons at the following addresses:
Denis Ashcroft
330 S Main
St. George UT 84770
Bruce Wilson, Atty
1/ 290 E 400 N
Provo UT 84 604
Liberty Mutual Insurance
PO Box 45440
Salt Lake City UT 84145-0440
Michael Dyer, Atty
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2465

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

/ /

•••/ • / " . / . /

June A. Stoddard, Paralegal
Adjudication Division

/jas

Ashcroft.ord
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Denis Ashcroft,

*
*

Applicant,
VS.

*
*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*

Airfax Express, and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
Respondents.

*
*

Case No. 91000984

*

*********************************

*

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following
errors:
1.
Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the
"Liberty Mutual account manager."
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum
medical improvement.
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not
decided upon a course of treatment.
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment.
5.
This case contains objective evidence of several
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS."
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will

EXHIBIT C
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briefly discuss the pertinent
allegations of error•

facts

as

they

relate

to the

There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the
original industrial injury in 1989. At that time, the applicant
was a driver for Air fax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His
employer told him to finish unloading.1 He apparently was able to
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room.
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of xrays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor,
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest,
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr.
Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time."
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the*doctor concluded on February 2,
1990 that the applicant was "...medically stable for return to
limited employment in nonlaboring activity." Id., at 26.
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency
room for treatment.
The doctor explained this episode as an
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a
student.
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant
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experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises.
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter)
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr.
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial
in nature.
The doctor concluded that additional medical
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in
connection with the 1989 injury...." Exhibit D-l at 67.
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that
• the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the
opinion of Dr. Wageman.
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial
accident. Thus, the applicantjias failed to show medical and legal
causation. u~~Urfdef these circumstances, no medical panel Ts"
necessary.
.
— —
,
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986).
The applicant's argument that he was still within the
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has
had numerous diagnostic tests completed. None of the specialists
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that
surgery is warranted or possible.
Dr. Holbrook, for example,
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was
complete.
This case is complicated by the applicants pre-existing
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced
upon him by AIDS.
In addition, the applicant suffered two
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicant's
continuing back problems.
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating,
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr.
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairmentf Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by
the American Medical Association.
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic.
We need some
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings,
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
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I certify that on August 21, 1992, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion For Review in the case of Denis Ashcroft was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Bruce Wilson
290 East 4000 North
Provo, Utah 84604
Michael Dyer
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge
Denis Ashcroft
3 30 South Mian
St. George UT 84770
Liberty Mutual Insurance
P. 0. Box 45440
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0440

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Legal Assistant
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